USA v. Philip  Muchisky by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-25-2020 
USA v. Philip Muchisky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Philip Muchisky" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 305. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/305 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 19-2697 
______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
PHILIP JOHN MUCHISKY, 
 
         Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 3-17-cr-00323-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Malachy E. Mannion 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 24, 2020 
 
BEFORE: JORDAN, RESTREPO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 25, 2020) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
____________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Philip Muchisky was charged with a criminal offense for production of child 
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), and another for possession of child 
pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a).  As part of a plea agreement with the 
government, Muchisky pled guilty to the production charge, and the government agreed 
to drop the possession charge.  At sentencing on July 10, 2019, the District Court 
imposed a restitution order that compensated the victims of the possession offense.1  
Muchisky argues that the order was illegal, because he was not convicted of the 
possession offense.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the order of restitution. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
Because we write for the parties, we do not recite the facts of this case—
regardless, most of the facts, beyond what we have recited above, are irrelevant for the 
purposes of this opinion.  We review the legality of the District Court’s restitution order 
de novo.  United States v. Kolodesh, 787 F.3d 224, 242 n.24 (3d Cir. 2015). 
While we agree with Muchisky that ordinarily courts cannot impose restitution 
beyond the scope of the conviction, see United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d 136, 141 (3d 
Cir. 1999), Congress expressly permits courts to “order restitution in any criminal case to 
the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement.”  18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3).  
 
1 The Court did not impose restitution for the victim of the production offense because he 
or she did not seek restitution. 
3 
 
Congress also allows courts to “order, if agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement, 
restitution to persons other than the victim of the offense.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 3663(a)(1)(A), 
3663A(a)(3).  To that end, the government points out that, as part of the plea agreement, 
Muchisky “agrees that the Government will seek and the court may impose an order of 
restitution as to the victims of the defendant’s relevant conduct.”  Supp. App. 17.  As 
such, the single issue in this case is whether Muchisky’s conduct charged under the 
possession offense was “relevant conduct” as specified in that section of the plea 
agreement. 
We conclude that it was.  As stated above, Congress authorizes a district court to 
order restitution in any criminal case to the extent the parties agree, including to persons 
who were not the victim of the offense.  Here, Muchisky’s conduct in relation to the 
possession charge was relevant to the criminal case.  After all, allegations of such 
conduct formed a part of the criminal complaint, see App. 18, and the pre-sentence report 
described said conduct.  There was no language in the plea agreement limiting the scope 
of restitution the government would seek and Muchisky explicitly was notified that he 
would be subject to restitution under § 3663A.  We find it eminently reasonable that the 
government, while exercising its prosecutorial discretion not to charge Muchisky with the 
possession offense, nevertheless could seek to obtain compensation for the victims of the 
crime.  It is understood that when the government agrees to the dismissal of a charge in a 
plea agreement, it is not admitting that it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not commit the dismissed offense.  Indeed, Congress may have had a 
4 
 
situation like that here in mind when allowing courts to impose restitution beyond the 
scope of crimes admitted in a plea agreement. 
Most tellingly, despite this issue being essentially one of contract construction, 
Muchisky makes no argument that the government’s interpretation of the plea agreement 
was not one he understood and to which he agreed when the agreement was executed.  In 
fact, he makes no effort to rebut the government’s contention that the restitution order 
was agreed upon, or that the District Court had the authority to issue a restitution order 
beyond the scope of the conviction per the plea agreement.  Accordingly, we will affirm 
the District Court’s July 10, 2019 restitution order. 
